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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the resource rent distribution aspect of the Kyoto 
process. The paper focuses on the “battle for resource rents” with oil consuming countries 
on one side and oil producing countries on the other. Our analysis is carried out within 
the framework of a theoretical model of resource extraction over time.  In particular, it is 
shown how CO2 emission caps may be used by the oil consuming countries, acting under 
the realm of the Kyoto process, to maximize the rent acquisition from oil producing 
countries and how the oil producing countries may constrain this possibility by exercising 
market power. The paper also compiles data and numerical results regarding the order of 
magnitudes of resource rents redistribution.   
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1. Introduction3 
In a single country perspective a tax on CO2-emissions has two effects. The first is to 
raise the consumer price of imported fossil fuels and thus induce firms and households to 
reduce the emissions of CO2.  The second is to bring revenues to the public sector. A 
system of tradable emission permits will have similar effects, although the extent of 
income redistribution between the private and public sectors depends on the initial 
distribution of emission permits. However, unless the country in question is a major 
importer of fossil fuels the world market price of these fuels will not be affected by the 
national climate policies. 
 
In contrast internationally coordinated CO2-taxation, or CO2-emissions trading, may 
affect the producer price of fossil fuels. In effect this means that resource importing 
countries may capture resource rents by implementing policies that constrain CO2-
emissions. The signatories of the Kyoto agreement, which came into effect in February 
2005, can be seen as a “club” whose members have agreed to coordinate their efforts to 
reduce CO2 emissions. Needless to say concern for the global climate is the prime 
motivation for forming the “club”. Yet the club may also function as an instrument for 
international redistribution of resource rents to the benefit of the consuming countries. At 
the same time a cartel on the producer side remains a powerful instrument for 
redistribution in the opposite direction. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the resource rent redistribution aspect of the 
Kyoto process. Our analysis is carried out within the framework of a theoretical model of 
resource extraction over time. Thus we focus on the “battle for resource rents” within a 
partial equilibrium framework, thus neglecting the macroeconomic 4  and general 
equilibrium effects of climate policies. As the vast literature on general equilibrium 
                                                 
3 Financial support from Centre for Business and Policy Analysis (SNS) within the frame of the ”Continue 
project”, as well as from the NEMIEC project within the Nordic Energy Research program, is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
4 There is a possibility that tax induced increases of the consumer price on an energy resource such as crude 
oil triggers a lasting recession like the one that took place after the first oil crises of 1973/74. The effect of 
this would be reduced oil demand in the recession period and thus reduced level of total oil wealth. 
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effects of climate policies5 shows these effects may be significant and therefore likely to 
affect the design of national climate policies. We also neglect public reactions against 
increasing fossil fuel taxes. The events in 2000, when several European countries 
experienced upheavals over soaring fuel prices in general and fossil fuel taxes in 
particular, show that fossil fuel taxation in reality may be subject to severe political 
constraints. However, neither general equilibrium effects nor political constraints on the 
use of policy instruments would change the main conclusions of our analysis. 
 
Before discussing the details of our modelling approach a brief background is needed. 
Models of resource extraction over time have been extensively used for analyses of the 
impact of taxation on resource extraction and prices over time. One key finding in this 
literature is that a constant ad valorem tax on a competitively supplied resource, that is 
available in a fixed amount and costless to extract, will fall entirely on the supplier.  
 
This result, which is due to Bergstrom (1982), holds both under perfect competition and 
monopoly. It is valid in a closed economy, as well as in a setting of an internationally 
traded resource with competitive suppliers and non-cooperative consuming countries 
applying constant ad valorem taxes. In fact, as noted by Bergstrom (1982) and Maskin 
and Newbery (1990) this result carries through even for models characterised by constant 
unit extraction cost. However, in models where marginal cost is an increasing function of 
extraction (Karp, 1984)6 the rent acquisition by consuming parties is not total but may 
still be sizeable.  
 
In the Bergstrom model the tax does not distort the allocation of resources in the 
economy. Hence, an ad valorem tax or a profit tax on oil production will simply lead to a 
                                                 
5 See the Special Issue of The Energy Journal (1999). 
6 However, several papers (e.g. Newbery, 1976; Maskin and Newbery, 1991, Karp and Newbery, 1991 
(a,b), 1992 ) point to the problem of dynamic inconsistencies that may arise in these kinds of  “open loop” 
models (i.e. models where plans are determined at the initial date and that depend on initial conditions and 
calendar time only). Problems like this may seriously restrict the relevance of “open loop” models in a real 
world setting, in particular if dominant players are involved. Karp and Newbery (1991) show, however, that 
an “open loop” Nash equilibrium with competitive or oligopolistic suppliers and competitive or 
oligopsonistic consumers all are dynamically consistent in a tariff setting game. The model to be presented 
in section 2 is of this kind.   
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lower producer price, and thus redistribution of the resource rent, while leaving the 
consumer price unaffected. From the point of view of the Kyoto process this means that 
internationally coordinated CO2-taxation is extremely powerful with respect to capturing 
resource rents, but completely powerless with respect to curbing the CO2-emissions. 
 
However, an environmental tax generally is not an ad valorem or a profit tax but rather 
an excise tax. It is an established result in the literature (e.g. Dasgupta and Heal, 1979; 
Conrad and Hool, 1981) that an excise tax distorts the time profiles for price and 
extraction of an exhaustible resource.  More precisely an excise tax leads - on the one 
hand - to higher current prices and reduced current consumption of the resource and - on 
the other hand - to reduced future prices and increased future consumption7. With CO2-
emissions being proportional to fossil fuel consumption this means that current CO2-
emissions will be reduced, while future CO2-emissions will be increased8.  
 
Hence, according to theory increasing excise taxes on fossil fuels should result in some 
increase of consumer prices and an increasing gap between consumer and producer 
prices. Empirical observations on prices and taxes on oil products seem to confirm the 
development suggested by the theoretical results. For example, in the G7 countries, tax 
rates on gasoline have increased substantially over time9. Although these taxes were not 
primarily introduced to internalise national or global externalities, their effects are similar 
to those of environmental taxes. For the European members of G7 the consumer prices 
have shown an increasing trend, while the producer price has shown a decreasing trend in 
                                                 
7 The effect of an excise or severance tax on the extraction profile of a depletable resource depends, 
however, also on the quality composition and the heterogeneity of the resource in question (See, 
Krautkraemer, 1988 and Deacon, 1993).   
8 Even though an environmental tax may succeed in shifting CO2-emission away from the present to the 
future, the tax levied may have to be rather sizeable in order to be potent. The reason for this is that rent 
acquisition will still be a feature with an excise tax. Hence, by levying environmental taxes, the consumer 
countries extract resource rent from the producer countries, which in its turn generates an increase of 
demand for the resource in the consumer countries (Farzin, 1996, Amundsen and Schöb, 1999).  The tax 
must be sufficient to take account of this rebound effect on demand and yet being able to tilt the extraction 
profile of the resource in the preferable direction. 
9 In 1980 the percentage of taxes in gasoline prices of the European members of the G7 countries was in the 
range of 45 - 60%. In 2004 this percentage had increased to 65 - 75%. Compared to this, the percentage of 
taxes in gasoline prices in the USA was about 12% in 1980, where as it increased to 23% in 2004. During 
the latter part of the 80’ies and the whole 90’ies the percentage of taxes in gasoline prices were, however 
considerable higher than what they were in 2004 (see IEA: Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues, 
OECD, Paris).     
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this period. The much lesser use of the tax instrument in North America (notably by the 
USA) has resulted in much more stable relationship between consumer and producer 
prices10.   
 
However, the Kyoto process is about internationally coordinated CO2 emission caps in 
conjunction with emission trading rather than excise taxes. But emission permit prices in 
effect are excise taxes. The main difference is that an excise tax is determined in a 
political/administrative process, while an emission permit price is determined by the cap 
on total emissions in conjunction with a regular market process11. The question then is 
how and to what extent CO2 emission caps in the “Kyoto countries” may affect the 
international distribution of resource rents.  
 
Our model is focused on the division of resource rent between producer and consumer 
countries. There are two policy instruments in the model: A CO2 emission constraint in 
the consuming countries, and the degree of cartelization in the producing countries. The 
CO2 emission constraint is the instrument by which the consuming countries can affect 
the division of resource rent to their own benefit. From the point of view of the producing 
countries the price of emission permits is an excise tax on the resource imposed by the 
consuming countries. The degree of cartelization is the instrument by which the 
producing countries can affect resource rent division to their favour.  
 
As already noted a number of papers have addressed the question as to how the 
consuming countries may capture resource rents by imposing taxes or import tariffs. The 
literature is somewhat more limited when it comes to studying the double objective of 
capturing resource rents and internalising external effects (see e.g Farzin, (1996) and 
Amundsen and Schöb, (1999)) and even more so when it comes to studying the role of 
market structure in this setting.   
                                                 
10 See IEA: Energy Prices and Taxes, various issues, OECD, Paris.    
11 Yet another difference, is that the revenue from selling emission permits goes to those parties that have 
initially been endowed with permits by the government (e.g. by “grandfathering” of free permits), whereas 
the revenue from an excise tax goes directly to the government.  Hence, the government possesses in this 
respect the power to redistribute the resource rent onto specific productive industries and groupings in the 
economy (e.g. the energy intensive industry).  
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 A notable exception is Wirl (1994) who studies the importance of market structure in a 
rent game with Pigovian taxes to internalise flow and stock externalities. Compared with 
Wirl (1994), however, we concentrate on announced levels of emission constraints (and 
not on Pigovian taxes as such) and seek to arrive at analytic expressions for the division 
of resource rent between the parties involved. These allow us more explicitly to study 
how and to what extent resource rent may be captured, and how important market 
structure is in this respect. We follow Wirl in restricting the analysis to study how 
variation of environmental measures affect pricing under given markets structures and do 
not investigate strategic Stackelberg outcomes.   
 
2. Optimal pricing and extraction under perfect competition  
We consider the global economy and divide the countries into resource producing 
countries and resource consuming countries. Furthermore, we assume there is a one to 
one correspondence between resource consumption and emission of CO2. Hence, 
constraining CO2-emission implies constraining resource consumption. As the objective 
of the paper is to illustrate principles and derive basic results, we set out to formulate 
optimal extraction models (competitive and monopolistic) of the simplest kind assuming 
a time invariant demand function and no extraction costs.  
 
2.1. Model  
We apply the following notation 
 
:tp  Price of the resource at date  t
:tx  Extraction of the resource at date  t
:tS  Remaining reserves of the resource at date t  
:δ  Discount rate  
:)(xpp =  Demand for the resource, with 0)( <∂
∂
x
xp
 
:p  Choke off price for the resource, i.e. )0(pp =  
 6
:xˆ  Consumption cap of the resource due to CO2-emission constraints 
 
At first we seek an equilibrium price path compatible with the actions of profit 
maximising competitive producers and competitive consumers jointly complying with a 
given CO2-emission cap, . The equilibrium price path may be found by considering the 
following optimisation problem  
xˆ
 
∫ −
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t
C
t dtexpMax
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δ   
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C
t C ≤≤≥≥=−= ,ˆ,0,0,, 0&   
 
Denoting the co-state variable and the Lagrangian multiplier by and , respectively, 
the Hamiltonian function corresponding to this problem reads 
C
tλ Ctµ
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These conditions imply that the optimal extraction path is to keep  in the interval xxCt ˆ=
[ ]Ct θ,0∈ i.e. from date 0 until date,  at which date the constraint cease to be )ˆ(xCθ
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binding. Clearly,  is a function of . After this date extraction proceeds according to 
the standard Hotelling rule for competitive producers given the remaining stock of the 
resource available at date 
Cθ xˆ
θ  i.e. . The price path is so determined that it hits the choke 
off price at the date 
CSθ
CT at which the stock is depleted.  
 
2.2. Optimal tax 
The next step is to determine the optimal excise tax, i.e. the price of emission permits that 
would induce the producing countries to comply with the emission constraint set by the 
consuming countries. The optimal tax in this sense is simply given by  
 
  tCt
C
t e
δµτ =)7
 
To verify this we consider the optimisation problem faced by the competitive producers 
under the tax proposed in 7). Hence, we have the following problem  
 
∫ −−
CT
tC
t
C
t
C
t dtexpMax
0
)( δτ   
subject to  
ppxSSSSx Ct
C
tT
C
t
C
t C ≤≥≥=−= ,0,0,, 0&   
 
In solving this problem we arrive at the following condition for the net producer price  
 
 ),0()()8 00
CTCCtC
t
C
t Ttforeppep
C ∈=−=− −− δδ ττ  
 
Hence, the net present value of marginal profit is constant and the Hotelling rule is 
satisfied for the whole extraction period. This implies that consumption and extraction 
comply with the emission constraint and thus that the price and tax paths are equilibrium 
paths.  
  
The optimal tax at a given date  may then be expressed as t
 8
  [ ] ),0(1ˆ)9 )( CtCt tforep C θτ θδ ∈−= −−  
 
Here and we have used the fact that)ˆ(ˆ xpp = [ ]CCCt Ttfor ,0 θµ ∈= . Hence, according 
to the above condition the tax should decline (exponentially) over time until the 
consumption constraint cease to be binding at date  where it becomes equal to zero.  Cθ
 
3. Acquisition of resource rent under perfect competition 
By constraining emissions, and thus resource consumption, the consuming countries 
manage to capture a part of the resource rent from the producing countries12. The size of 
these rent elements (rent captured by the consuming countries and rent remaining with 
the resource producing countries) differ according to the size of the consumption 
constraint and market form. 
 
3.1. Rent partition 
Resource rent remaining with the competitive producers ( ) is equal to pc
 
[ ]Sp CCpc 0ˆ)10 τ−=Π  
 
Resource rent captured by the resource consuming ( ) countries is equal to cc
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−=Π −
−
C
C
eexp CCcc
δθ
δθ
θδ
1ˆˆ)11  
 
Hence, total resource rent may be written 
 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that the surplus captured by the resource consuming countries also contains consumer 
surplus captured from its own consumers in addition to pure resource rent captured from the resource 
producing countries.  
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[ ] CCCCC eSpexpSpeexp CCCccCpcC δθθδθδθδθ δτθδ −
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The size of this expression changes as x  changes. If  where  is equal to the 
optimal unconstrained extraction at date 0, then the total rent 
ˆ *0ˆ
Cxx ≥ *0Cx
Sxp CC )( *0=Π  (i.e. ) 
and if then . For the competitive case there may exist values of x , 
 that actually imply larger values of total rent than the total rent under the 
optimal unconstrained extraction (
0=Ctτ
0ˆ =x 0=Π C ˆ
*ˆ0 Coxx <<
Sxp C )( *0 ). The reason for this is that the emission 
constraint stretches the optimal extraction path so that it comes closer to the optimal 
unconstrained monopoly extraction path that implies maximum resource rent. The level 
of the emission constraint maximising total rent, , must satisfy the following necessary 
first order condition   
*ˆ Cx
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In evaluating this expression one should observe that 0)ˆ( <∂∂ xCθ and 0)ˆ( <∂∂ xT C . 
The first element on the right hand side (RHS) of 13) is indeterminate and depends on the 
size of the price elasticity (see below). The second element is negative and the third 
element is positive. Hence, in general, it is not possible to decide whether there exists a 
value of the emission constraint,  ( ) that maximises total resource rent 
under perfect competition. However, with the variable elastic demand function applied in 
the Appendix, such a value exists. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. using specific parameter 
values.   
*ˆ Cx *0
*ˆ0 CC xx <<
 
3.2. Maximising rent take 
Assuming that the resource consuming countries are only interested in internalising the 
external environmental effect from CO2-emission, the choice of will be independent of 
the size of the resource rent that the resource using countries capture. However, the 
xˆ
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resource consuming countries may have a further objective of maximising the rent take 
from the resource producing countries using CO2-abatement as a rationale. Hence, we are 
looking for a value  that maximises . In the competitive case the first order 
condition for such a maximum is equal to 
*ˆ Cccx
C
ccΠ
 
 0
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11
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Hence, the RHS of 14) is seen to contain the two first elements of the RHS of 13). As 
already observed, the sign of the first element on the right hand side is indeterminate 
while the second is negative. The sign of the first element is determined by the price 
elasticity. If demand is price inelastic (i.e. 0ˆ1 <<− ε ), the first element is also negative 
and a marginally harsher emission constraint will lead to an increased acquisition of 
resource rent on the part of the consuming countries. However, in order for 14) to be 
satisfied, the demand at the optimum value, , must be elastic (i.e. *ˆ Cccx 1ˆ −<ε ). Hence a 
necessary condition for the existence of such a value is that the demand function can 
attain values for which it is elastic. Broad classes of demand functions satisfy this 
requirement, including linear demand functions and functions of the form considered in 
the Appendix.  
 
Comparing 14) to 13) it turns out that the level of emission constraint maximising tax 
take by the consuming countries is less than the emission constraint that maximises total 
resource rent, i.e. . This can be seen by evaluating 13) at  ** ˆˆ CCcc xx < *ˆ Cccx
  
 0
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Hence, total rent, , will increase by a marginal relaxation of the constraint (i.e. a 
marginal increase of x  above ). For an illustration see Fig. 1 which has been 
generated by means of the numerical model described in the Appendix. 
CΠ
ˆ *ˆ Cccx
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4. Recapturing resource rent by the use of market power   
Confronted with consuming countries that maximise rent take using environmental taxes, 
the producing countries may enter into collusion (or strengthen an already existing cartel) 
in order to recapture some of the rent. At one extreme the producers may form a 
monopoly and even though the producers will still be subjected to taxation the producers 
may limit the rent acquisition of the consuming countries.  
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4.1. Model  
In this section we seek an equilibrium price path compatible with the actions of a profit 
maximising monopolist and competitive consumers jointly complying with a given CO2-
emission cap, . This may be found by considering the following optimisation problem  xˆ
 
∫ −
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Denoting the co-state variable and the Lagrangian multiplier by and , respectively, 
the Hamiltonian function corresponding to this problem reads 
M
tλ Mtµ
 
( )xxxexxpH MtMtMtMttMtMtMt ˆ)( −−−= − µλδ   
Necessary conditions for a maximum are 
 
( )
0)21
ˆ)()20
0)ˆ()19
0ˆ)18
)17
011)16
≥
−−−=
=−=∂
∂
≤−=∂
∂
=∂
∂−
≤−−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=∂
∂
−
∂−
M
T
M
T
M
T
M
T
M
T
TM
T
M
T
M
T
M
t
M
t
M
tM
t
M
t
M
t
t
M
t
M
tM
ty
M
t
M
t
M
t
t
M
t
M
tM
t
M
t
M
MMMMMMM
xxxexxpH
xx
H
xx
H
S
H
ep
x
H
λ
µλ
µµµ
γ
λ
µλε
δ
&
  
 
As for the competitive solution we observe that the optimal extraction path is to keep 
 in the interval xx Mt ˆ= [ ]Mt θ,0∈  i.e. from date 0 until date  at which date the )ˆ(xMθ
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constraint cease to be binding. Date  is a function of x . After this date extraction 
proceeds according to the standard Hotelling rule for a monopoly, given the remaining 
stock of the resource available at date  i.e. . The price path is so determined that it 
hits the choke off price at the date 
Mθ ˆ
Mθ MMSθ
MT at which date the stock is depleted.   
 
It should be noted that  and consequently that and that MC MC SS θθ < )ˆ()ˆ( xx MC θθ >
MC TT < . The reason for this is that the price path under monopoly evolves at a slower 
rate than the competitive price path (except for the special case of a constant elastic 
demand function at which the price paths are identical, see Stiglitz, 1976). The only 
constellation compatible with the Hotelling rules for the two market forms and the total 
resource constraint, S  (assumed to be identical for the two cases) is that the monopoly 
price path starts to rise above at an earlier date than the competitive price path starts to 
rise. At some later date the monopoly price path crosses the rising competitive price path 
and hits the choke off price at a later date than the competitive price path hits the choke 
off price.   
pˆ
 
4.2. Optimal tax 
The next step is to determine the optimal tax (i.e. the permit prices) that would induce the 
producing countries to comply with the emission constraint set by the consuming 
countries. The optimal tax in this sense is given by  
 
tM
t
M
t e
δµτ =)22  
 
To verify this we consider the optimisation problem faced by the competitive producers 
under the tax proposed in 7). Hence, we have the following problem  
 
∫ −−
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Solving this problem we arrive at  
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Hence, the net present value of marginal profit is constant and the Hotelling rule for 
monopoly is obeyed for the whole extraction period. The price and tax paths are thus 
equilibrium paths.  
  
The optimal tax path may then be expressed as 
 
 [ ] ),0(1)
ˆ
11(ˆ)24 )( MtMt tforep
M θετ
θδ ∈−+= −−  
 
Here and we have used the fact that )ˆ(ˆ xpp = [ ]MMMt Ttfor ,0 θµ ∈= . Provided that 
demand is elastic at the extraction level corresponding to the emission constraint, the tax 
should decline (exponentially) over time until the consumption constraint cease to be 
binding at . If demand is inelastic at this level 24) implies paying a subsidy in order to 
have the monopolist complying with the constraint. It should be noted, however, that 
without the constraint (i.e. free adaptation) the monopolist will set an initial extraction 
level, , for which demand is elastic, i.e. 13. Assuming that the elasticity 
is a non-decreasing function of consumption, (i.e. 
Mθ
*
0
Mx 1)( *0 −<Mxε
0)( >dxd ε , as is the case for linear 
demand functions and for the function considered in the Appendix), demand will remain 
elastic when imposing a binding constraint of emission. Hence, for broad classes of 
demand functions, consuming countries will be able to extract resource rent from the 
producers even under monopoly.   
                                                 
13 If demand is inelastic at all consumption levels (e.g. constant elastic), the monopolist will apply limit 
pricing i.e. set a price marginally below the choke off price.  
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 4.3. Rent partition 
Under monopoly the resource rent remaining with the monopolistic producer ( ) is 
equal to 
pc
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Resource rent captured by the resource consuming countries ( ) is equal to cc
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +=Π −
−
M
M
eexp MMcc
δθ
δθ
θδε
1
ˆ
11ˆˆ)26  
 
Hence, total resource rent may be written 
    
 dtexpexp t
T
M
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The size of this expression changes as x  changes. If  where  is equal to the 
optimal unconstrained extraction at date 0, then the total rent 
(i.e. ) and if, 
ˆ *0ˆ
Mxx ≥ *0Mx
dtexp t
T
M
t
M
t
M
M
δ−∫=Π
0
0=Mtτ 0ˆ =x , then . Under monopoly the 
largest value of total resource rent is attained for i.e. the unconstrained case. The 
reason for this is that the monopolist maximises resource rent wherefore an additional 
binding extraction constraint, x , must lead to reduced resource rent. Hence, this result 
deviates from the competitive case. In general, a relaxation of the constraint will lead to 
an increase of total rent, i.e. 
0=Π M
*ˆ 0
Mxx ≥
ˆ
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Assuming elastic demand at x , inspection of signs shows that the above derivative is 
strictly positive for binding values of x . Hence, a relaxation of the constraint x  is 
definitely leading to an increase of total resource rent. To see this, observe that the first 
expression on the right hand side is positive under the assumption of elastic demand at . 
Furthermore, the second expression on the right hand side of the equality sign is also 
positive as 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
xˆ
0)ˆ( <∂∂ xMθ  and so is the third expression as ( ) 0ˆ >∂∂ xS MMθ . An illustration 
is given in Fig.2. 
 
4.4. Maximising rent take  
However, as under perfect competition the resource consuming countries may have an 
additional objective of maximising the rent take from the resource producing countries 
under the cover of limiting emission from resource consumption. The value of x  that 
maximises rent take under monopoly may differ from the value that maximises rent take 
under perfect competition.  Under monopoly, the value of x that maximises is 
determined by the following condition  
ˆ
ˆ MccΠ
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The first expression to the RHS of the equality sign of 29) is positive and the second is 
negative (provided that price elasticity is a non-decreasing function of consumption). 
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 Comparing the size of the resource rent captured by the consuming countries under 
perfect competition and under monopoly for the same level of x , it is clear that the 
former is larger than the latter14, i.e.   
ˆ
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This follows from the fact that 1ˆ −<ε and that implying that 
(provided that ).  This relationship also implies that the 
consuming countries capture a larger maximal resource rent under perfect competition 
than under monopoly. To realise this observe that  
MC θθ >
MC
ee MC δθδθ θθ −− < 1>δθ
 
 31)  )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( *** MMcc
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cc xxx Π>Π≥Π
 
In the same way, the resource rent retained by the producers is larger under monopoly 
than under perfect competition. This can be realised in the following way. We know that 
 and that . Hence,  )ˆ()ˆ( xx CM Π>Π )ˆ()ˆ( xx MccCcc Π>Π
 
)ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( xxxxxx Cpc
C
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MM
pc Π=Π−Π>Π−Π=Π   
 
From this we get 
  
 32)  )ˆ()ˆ()ˆ( *** CCpc
CM
pc
MM
pc xxx Π>Π≥Π
                                                 
14 It is assumed that demand is elastic at , but not constant elastic. As noted, if demand were constant 
elastic, the price and extraction profiles under perfect competition and monopoly would coincide. 
xˆ
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4. Robustness of the results 
The conclusions derived this far are based on simplifying assumptions and the principle 
of Occam’s razor. Thus it is assumed that demand is constant over time, and that there is 
no technological progress or substitution. The question then is to what extent our main 
results would change if these simplifying assumptions were relaxed. In this section we 
will briefly discuss the robustness of the results with respect to some of the factors left 
out of the model.  
 
The case of demand increasing with time is not included in the numerical illustration but 
is, in fact, allowed by the mathematics of the model. However, this concerns a special 
case of demand increase where the back stop price remains constant along time while the 
demand schedule pivots in a north- easterly direction with the back stop price as the 
pivoting point. Hence, nothing essential happens to the mathematics derived when 
allowing for demand increase, but the illustrations would need to be adjusted accordingly. 
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If demand would increase over time the period of constant price (where the emission 
constraint is binding) would extend for a longer time and the necessary taxes to support a 
constant demand would be higher. This implies a larger rent take by the consuming 
countries. However, with increasing demand also the producing countries would increase 
their rent take as there is a general increase of total resource rent, attached to the demand 
increase. The general results on rent division, and rent maximisation will not be altered15.  
 
Technological progress can be seen as a general reduction of the back stop price as time 
passes i.e. that a perfect substitute to the resource considered becomes cheaper over time. 
In general such a development would, ceteris paribus, lead to a reduction of total 
resource rent since, in a sense, the resource in question becomes less scarce. The 
mathematics of the model would have to be changed and would become somewhat more 
complicated (though the Hotelling rule under competition and monopoly would still have 
to be satisfied in equilibrium).  
 
However, with exogenous technological progress, the general results of the model would 
still be true, i.e. that consuming countries extract resource rent from the producing 
countries when internalising emission caps by way of taxes and that these countries can 
optimise on rent take by adjusting the emission caps. Also, the producing countries would 
still be able to constrain rent redistribution by collusion and the use of market power.  
 
An interesting case to be considered is where technological progress is induced by the 
resource price itself, i.e. that a high price on the resource would induce technological 
progress and thus a long-term reduction of total resource rent. Such a development would 
not be in the interest of the producing countries and perhaps even not of the consuming 
countries that would otherwise stand to lose part of its rent acquisition.  
 
                                                 
15 Referring to the case of crude oil it has been pointed out that the increasing prices are linked to 
restraining refinery capacity. It should be noted that increasing demand and shrinking refinery capacity give 
rise to increasing quasi rent on refinery capital. Hence, there are really three parties involved in splitting the 
resource rent: resource producers, tax authorities, and refinery owners.  
 
 20
The general conclusion of this brief discussion is that the assumptions about constant 
demand and no technological progress simplify the analysis but are not essential for the 
main results.  
 
5. Orders of magnitude 
Total resource rent and its annual redistribution among countries are considerable in 
terms of purchasing power. Hence, it would be of interest to try to assess the values 
involved. To our knowledge no single numerical model exists to capture all aspects of the 
problem considered in this paper i.e. external effects and emission targets, market forms, 
division of resource rent between producer and consumer countries and macro economic 
effects on the countries involved. However, there exist numerical models and studies that 
take account of some of the aspects of the problems at hand. Results from these studies 
may be used to give some indications as to the orders of magnitude involved.  
 
Amundsen (1992) found that market form matters a lot when it comes to the size of the 
total resource rent. In a model taking account of various crude oil qualities, refinery 
capacity, transportation costs, distribution costs, and different levels and cost of proven 
and probable reserves, it was found that oil resource rent outside the former “socialist 
block” varied according to whether the petroleum markets were organised as a perfect 
competitive market, a monopoly or a (dynamically consistent) Nash-Cournot market. 
Under monopoly total oil wealth (net present value of future oil resource rent) amounted 
to 10,100 billion 1986 USD, while it was less then half of this under perfect competition 
(4,500 billion USD) and 8,100 billion USD under the Nash-Cournot solution. The part of 
oil rent captured by OPEC was highest under monopoly (92 %), intermediary under 
perfect competition (75 %) and lowest under the Nash-Cournot solution (58 %). These 
figures are based on the assumption that only the proven reserves (in 1986) were 
exploited. If also probable reserves were included the oil wealth under monopoly would 
increase by another 1,300 billion USD, while it would actually fall under perfect 
competition and under the Nash-Cournot solution due to the reduced scarcity of oil in that 
case.   
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The effect on oil wealth of introducing an emission permit system was investigated by 
Amundsen, Rasmussen  and Lønning (1995) using a numerical model incorporating 
major regions of the world and including various traded goods and resources such as coal 
and oil/gas. In the model total future CO2 emissions allowed was restricted to the 1990 
emission level. Considering a system of tradable emission permits distributed in 
proportion to the level of CO2 emissions for each region it was found that for five of the 
six regions of the world considered restrictions on CO2 emission hardly mattered at all in 
terms of GNP changes (less than 1%). The sixth region and the major looser was OPEC 
who experienced a decrease in GNP of more than 10% as compared to the GNP level 
without CO2 restrictions. With the permit system there was a general consumer price 
increase of oil/gas of 70% between 1990 and 2008 and a corresponding increase of 8% 
for the producer price of oil/gas. The effect on OPECs GNP would, however, depend on 
the way emission permits are distributed. For instance, OPEC would be somewhat better 
off if permits were distributed according to population size rather than by grandfathering.   
 
Important insight may also be gained from a study by Berg et al. (1997) that applies a 
numerical model including oil, natural gas and coal. In their study they found that a 10 
USD carbon tax resulted in a reduction of OPEC’s oil wealth of 23 % while non-OPEC 
oil wealth was reduced by 8%. With a competitive organisation of the oil market OPEC’s 
oil wealth would still be reduced by some 20% while that of Non-OPEC producers would 
be reduced by nearly 40 %. In assessing these figures it should, however, be noted that 
the problem addressed is not quite comparable to the problem considered in the present 
paper. Berg et al. (1997) consider the effect on oil wealth of a given CO2-tax for various 
market forms. In that respect emission of CO2 may increase over time and will not 
necessarily be below some given CO2 constraint as in the present paper. Also the effect 
on CO2 emission of the given tax will be different under various market forms.  
 
Comparable results are obtained in a more recent study by Kverndokk et al. (2000) based 
on a modified version of the same model as used in Berg et al. (1997). In particular this 
model takes account of various marker baseline scenarios to represent different future 
worlds without greenhouse gas mitigation and investigates the effects of various caps for 
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future CO2 concentration in the atmosphere. Even though OPEC and other oil producers 
stand to loose oil revenue with the introduction of carbon taxes for all binding emission 
caps, a conclusion of this paper is that the oil producers will not face major reductions in 
their revenues as long as the concentration target is not too tight. In evaluating the results 
it should be noted, however, that the model uses constant CO2 taxes for the whole period 
to achieve the target in 2150, that the GDP-development in the various regions are 
exogenously determined and that there are no macro module included. Hence, the 
emission paths for CO2 as determined by the constant CO2 taxes do not necessarily 
correspond to least cost emission paths. 
 
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
In February 2005 the Kyoto agreement finally came into effect. The prime motivation for 
this agreement is concern for the global climate and the corresponding need to reduce the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. However, the Kyoto agreement can also be seen in an 
alternative perspective. By coordinating their climate policies the oil consuming countries 
in effect will implement a coordinated reduction of the consumption of oil. This will have 
an impact on the producer price of oil and thus on the distribution of resource rents.  
 
This paper offers a simple theoretical framework for understanding the fight over oil 
resource rent between the producer countries and the governments of the consumer 
countries using CO2 emission caps as a means of acquiring resource rent.  More precisely, 
it is shown that the oil consuming countries by fixing emission caps and introducing 
corresponding markets for emission permits, may manage to reduce the producer price of 
oil and at the same time acquire resource rents in terms of revenue from the emission 
permit system. Hence, in this sense, the emission permit price functions like an excise tax 
on oil.   
 
One particular result obtained in the paper is that an emission cap with corresponding 
emission permit prices may, in fact, increase the total resource rent under perfect 
competition as compared with the total resource rent under perfect competition without 
the emission cap. The reason for this is that the extraction profile with the emission cap 
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comes closer to what it would have been under monopoly, which implies the maximum 
size of the resource rent. The competitive producers will, however, receive a smaller and 
smaller resource rent the harsher are the CO2-emission caps.  
 
Furthermore, it is shown that the consuming countries may optimise with respect to the 
emission caps i.e. put the cap so as to maximise the resource rent that they capture. This 
may imply forcing the CO2-emissions to a lower level than what it would have been out 
of pure environmental concern. Confronted with such a development the producers may 
unite and act collusively in order to capture more of the resource rent themselves. The 
producing countries may form a monopoly and thus tilt the extraction profile in the 
direction of reduced current extraction (which is known to be the result of collusion.) In 
the paper it is shown that the producers by this measure to some extent may respond to 
the consumer countries’ wish of reducing current consumption. In this way current 
producer prices will increase and emission permit prices will decrease. The producer 
countries may, thus, avoid a massive transfer of resource rent to the consumer countries.  
 
Appendix: An example 
To illustrate the results of the model the following demand function is applied under 
perfect competition and under monopoly 
 xePp α−=  
Otherwise we use the same notation as in the main text  
 
Perfect competition 
Solving the model for perfect competition we get 
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Monopoly 
Solving the model for monopoly we get 
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In the formulae the following approximation has been applied16 
tt hxx
tt
t
t
t ePexPxdx
dp
p ααα −− ≈−=+ )1(  
where . 5,2=h
 
For the illustrations we use the following parameters values17 
 1000,1,0,01,0,500 ==== SP δα
                                                 
16 See Perman et al. (1999), p. 212 
17 In order to have a positive marginal revenue for the monopolist and thus avoid limit pricing α must be 
chosen sufficiently small such that 1<txα .  
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